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Abstract—Goldreich-Goldwasser-Halevi (GGH) public key 
cryptosystem is an instance of lattice-based cryptosystems whose 
security is based on the hardness of lattice problems. In fact, 
GGH cryptosystem is the lattice version of the first code-based 
cryptosystem, proposed by McEliece. However, it has a number 
of drawbacks such as; large public key length and low security 
level. On the other hand, Low Density Lattice Codes (LDLCs) are 
the practical classes of lattice codes which can achieve capacity 
on the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel with low 
complexity decoding algorithm. This paper introduces a public 
key cryptosystem based on LDLCs to withdraw the drawbacks of 
GGH cryptosystem. To reduce the key length, we employ the 
generator matrix of the used LDLC in Hermite normal form 
(HNF) as the public key. Also, by exploiting the linear decoding 
complexity of the used LDLC, the decryption complexity is 
decreased compared with GGH cryptosystem. These increased 
efficiencies allow us to use the bigger values of security 
parameters. Moreover, we exploit the special Gaussian vector 
whose variance is upper bounded by the Poltyrev limit as the 
perturbation vector. These techniques can resist the proposed 
scheme against the most efficient attacks to the GGH-like 
cryptosystems.  
Keywords—Channel Coding; Code-Based Cryptography; 
Lattice Codes; Lattice-Based Cryptography.  
I. INTRODUCTION 
Code and lattice-based cryptography are two of the most 
promising candidates to post quantum cryptography. It is 
believed that code and lattice-based cryptosystems are able to 
resist the attacks performed by quantum computers. In fact, 
there is no known quantum algorithm allows attacking them 
significantly faster than classical algorithms. The security 
provided by such cryptosystems is based on the difficulty of 
some classical problems related to coding theory and lattices, 
respectively [1]. Up to now, various public key code and 
lattice-based cryptosystems have been introduced and 
developed. One of the instances of lattice-based public key 
cryptosystems is proposed by Goldreich, Goldwasser and 
Halevi, known as GGH cryptosystem [2]. In fact, GGH public 
key scheme is the lattice analog of the McEliece cryptosystem 
[3] in which Goppa codes are replaced by lattices. The GGH 
scheme has some advantages, such as [4]: (1) it seems to be 
more secure than RSA and ElGamal encryption schemes 
against quantum computers; (2) it has a natural signature 
scheme; (3) unlike NTRU cryptosystem [5], the secret key of 
the GGH scheme cannot be obtained by solving the shortest 
vector problem (SVP). However, it has a number of 
weaknesses as follows [6]: (1) because of special form of the 
perturbation vector employed in the GGH scheme, the 
problem of decrypting ciphertext can be reduced to easier 
problem and thus partial information on plaintext can be 
recovered; (2) the GGH cryptosystem is insecure against 
adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2); (3) its key length 
is very large.  
On the other hand, Low Density Lattice Codes (LDLCs) are 
an efficient class of lattice codes which can achieve capacity 
on the additive white Gaussian noise (AWGN) channel [7]. 
LDLCs have the nonsingular generator matrix  , i.e.,        
  , and their parity check matrix       is restricted to be 
sparse. The sparsity of   in the LDLCs is utilized to develop a 
low complexity iterative decoding algorithm. The main goal of 
this study is to introduce a public key scheme based on 
LDLCs to overcome the drawbacks of the GGH cryptosystem. 
We use the properties of lattices and coding theory to improve 
the efficiency and security of our scheme. By exploiting an 
efficient iterative LDLC decoding algorithm, the decryption 
complexity is reduced. Moreover, by performing the Hermite 
normal form (HNF) [8] of the generator matrix of the used 
LDLC, the public key length is decreased. To improve the 
security level, we use the Gaussian vector whose variance is 
upper bounded with Poltyrev limit [9] as the perturbation 
vector. In this case, the proposed scheme can resist the most 
efficient attack to GGH cryptosystem, called as Embedding 
attack [6]. Also, by employing the Fujisaki-Okamoto 
conversion [10], the proposed scheme is not insecure against 
CCA2 and broadcast attack.  
This paper is organized as follows. Section II gives an 
introduction to lattices, low density lattice codes and also 
reviews the construction of GGH cryptosystem. Section III 
explains the concept of the proposed public key cryptosystem 
based on LDLCs. The efficiency and security of the proposed 
cryptosystem are also assessed in Sections IV and V, 
respectively. Finally, Section VI concludes the paper.  
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II. LATTICES, LOW DENSITY LATTICE CODES AND GGH 
CRYPTOSYSTEM 
A. Lattices and Low Density Lattice Codes 
An  -dimensional lattice   over   , where    , is the set 
of all integer linear combinations of some linearly independent 
vectors          , i.e.,   {∑      |    } . The vectors 
        are called basis vectors and the set of vectors 
{       } is called a basis of  . In this case, the dimension of 
lattice   is   and its basis matrix (also called generator matrix 
in channel coding) is the     matrix   whose   rows are the 
basis vectors        . The lattice constructed by the 
generator matrix   is the set of all integral linear combinations 
of the rows of  , i.e.,      {       }, where   is an  -
dimensional vector of integers. Hence, every point of the 
lattice      is of the form     . The  -th successive minima 
of lattice     , denoted by         , is the smallest real 
number such that there exist    non-zero linear independent 
vector              with ‖  ‖   ‖  ‖          The 
lattice      is called full-dimensional if      [7, 11]. In the 
rest of this paper, for simplicity, we assume that      is full-
dimensional and its generator matrix is the      square 
matrix. However, this case can be easily extended to the non-
square generator matrix. Let   be a non-singular     matrix, 
the orthogonality defect and dual orthogonality defect of   are 
obtained as        |        |∏ ‖  ‖  and    
     
|      |∏ ‖  
 ‖  , respectively where,   
  is the  -th row in    . 
One well-known equivalent lower triangular form related to 
the generator matrix   is called the Hermite normal form 
(HNF) of  , denoted by          . It is shown that given an 
    nonsingular integer valued matrix  , there exist an     
unimodular matrix   such that the HNF of   is obtained as 
             [8]. In this case, the entries of lower 
triangular         
  ,         , have the following 
properties: (1) if     , then     
     (2) if    , then      
     
(3) if    , then       
      
 .  
The problem of finding a vector         such that 
  ‖  ‖           is called shortest vector problem (SVP) 
which is known as NP-complete problem [12]. Given a vector 
      , a basis   and a vector   (which is usually not in the 
lattice), the problem of finding the lattice vector   closest to   
is called closest vector problem (CVP). The complexity of 
general CVP was analyzed by van Emde Boas who showed 
that this problem is NP-hard [13]. In channel coding, CVP is 
referred to as lattice decoding problem (LDP) [11]. Another 
hard problem related to lattices is shortest basis problem 
(SBP) in which given a basis   for a lattice in   , the goal is 
to find the basis    which has the smallest orthogonality 
defect. It is known that there is no known polynomial time 
algorithm to solve SBP [2]. An  -dimensional lattice code 
over    is defined by an  -dimensional lattice         and 
a shaping region      [11, 14]. In this case, the codewords 
are all the points of lattice      which are lied within the 
shaping region  . Inspired by Low Density Parity Check 
(LDPC) codes and in the goal of finding practical low 
complexity lattice codes, Low Density Lattice Codes (LDLCs) 
are introduced [7]. An  -dimensional LDLC over    is an  -
dimensional lattice code with a nonsingular generator matrix 
 , i.e.,          , for which the parity check matrix       
is restricted to be sparse. The sparsity of   in LDLCs is 
utilized to develop a linear complexity iterative decoding 
algorithm by which good error performance is attained at large 
block length. The  -th row degree, denoted by   ,        , is 
the number of nonzero elements in the row   of the parity 
check matrix  . Moreover, the  -th column degree, denoted by 
  ,        , is defined as the number of nonzero elements 
in column   of the parity check matrix  . An LDLC is regular 
if all the row/column degrees of   are equal to a common 
degree  . A regular LDLC with degree   is called Latin square 
LDLC if every row/column of the parity check matrix   has 
the same   nonzero values. In a Latin square LDLC, the 
values of the   non-zero coefficients in each row and each 
column are some permutation of the values           . The 
sorted sequence of these   nonzero values            
  is called the generating sequence of Latin square LDLC [7].  
B. The Structure of GGH Public Key Cryptosystem 
The security of GGH public key cryptosystem [2] relies on 
the computational difficulty of CVP. To generate the key, two 
different bases, called as public basis (or public key)        
and private basis (or private key)       , of the same lattice 
     are used. The private basis   is an     matrix with a 
low dual orthogonality defect. It can be generated as      
  , where,   is an     identity matrix,    [   
 ] is an     
matrix such that |   
 |    and   √   for some constant  . The 
public key   is an     matrix with a high dual orthogonality 
defect such that generates the same lattice as  , i.e.,      
    . The public key   is generated as           , where 
   is the unimodular matrix (a matrix with integer entries and 
determinant of unit magnitude). To encrypt a message    , 
the ciphertext is obtained as         The vector   {  }  
is called perturbation (or error) vector, where,   is a small 
constant. At the receiver, the vector      is recovered as 
   ⌈    ⌋ , where         is the unimodular matrix and 
⌈    ⌋ denotes the vector obtained by rounding each entry in 
     to the nearest integer. Hence, ⌈    ⌋   ⌈          
  ⌋     ⌈    ⌋ and the decryption works if ⌈    ⌋   .  
III. THE PROPOSED PUBLIC KEY SCHEME  
A. Why We Use LDLCs? 
At this point, the main question is that why we employ 
LDLCs in the structure of proposed public key scheme. To 
response this question, we cite the following reasonable 
causes: (1) One important subject about the proposed public 
key scheme is to find the families of easily and low 
complexity decodable lattice codes for a legitimate receiver 
(by the knowledge of private key), such that the decoding of 
these codes is infeasible for an active attacker (without the 
knowledge of private key) in polynomial time. It is shown that 
LDLCs have efficient and low complexity iterative decoding 
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algorithm by which the better error performance can be 
attained [7] compared to other similar codes such as; LDPC 
lattice codes [15]. Moreover, if the HNF of their generator 
matrix is considered as the public key, then the decoding of 
these codes is infeasible for the active attacker. (2) LDLCs 
have a sufficient tradeoff between error performance and code 
length. This property allows us to use larger values of security 
parameters in the proposed scheme which leads to be secure 
against the cryptanalytic attacks, such as; the round-off attack 
and the nearest plane attack (see Sec. V). (3) By exploiting the 
properties of LDLCs, the security of the proposed scheme is 
based on two inherent hard lattice problems, i.e., SBP and 
CVP. In fact, recovering the generator matrix   from the 
public key           is equivalent to solve SBP. Also, 
finding the closest lattice point to ciphertext   requires solving 
CVP. This strategy leads to improve the security level of the 
proposed scheme. (4) By using the LDLCs in the proposed 
scheme, a relationship can be established between code-based 
cryptography and lattice-based cryptography. In this case, we 
can exploit from the efficient properties of codes and lattices, 
simultaneously to improve the security and efficiency. 
B. Key Generation 
 The secret key set is      {   }, where   is the sparse 
parity check matrix of the used LDLC and   is the     
unimodular matrix. The umimodular matrix   is used for 
converting the generator matrix       of the used LDLC to 
its Hermite normal form (HNF). To obtain the public key, 
denoted by   , first the generator matrix of the used LDLC is 
constructed as       and then its HNF, i.e.,           
  , is considered as the public key. In this case, the generator 
matrix of the used LDLC and its HNF are two different bases 
of the same lattice, i.e.,           . The HNF    depends on 
the lattice       not on the generator matrix  . Therefore, the 
public key    gives no information about the parameters of the 
secret key set, i.e.,       and  .  
C. Encryption  
In the proposed public key scheme, an integer information 
sequence is considered as a plaintext vector (message)    . 
To encrypt the message , the sender (Alice) first fetches the 
public key           from the public directory. Then, she 
constructs a codeword (lattice point) as          , where 
     . Finally, the ciphertext is obtained as         
   , where                  
   is a Gaussian vector 
with mean   and variance          ⁄ . The ciphertext   is 
transmitted through the insecure noiseless channel. Due to 
addition of codeword   and Gaussian perturbation vector  , the 
transmission of ciphertext   through noiseless channel is 
equivalent to transmission of codeword   through AWGN 
channel without power restrictions. It is shown that for power 
unconstrained AWGN channel, there exists a lattice code of 
dimension   such that the lattice point (codeword)       can 
be decoded with arbitrarily small error probability if and only if 
the variance    of noise vector   is less than     
  
 √|      | 
 
      ⁄  [7, 9]. In fact, this maximum noise 
variance that a lattice code should tolerate to have reliable 
communication over unconstrained AWGN channel is called 
Poltyrev limit [9]. In the proposed scheme, since the generator 
matrix of the used LDLC is non-singular, i.e.,         , the 
maximum noise variance is equal to     
        ⁄ . 
Therefore, to achieve the reliable communication and also have 
small error probability, we consider the Gaussian vector with 
variance          ⁄  as the perturbation vector  . 
D. Decryption 
The legitimate receiver (Bob) observes the ciphertext  
     . In this case, by the knowledge of secret key set    , 
he constructs the generator matrix       of the used LDLC 
and attempts to estimate the closest lattice point to the 
ciphertext  , i.e.,  ̂    ̂ , using the low complexity iterative 
LDLC decoding algorithm. The estimate of lattice point  ̂ is 
not directly found in the LDLC decoding algorithm. Instead, 
the probability density function (pdf) of the codeword 
           , i.e.,   ̂  |   |  ,           , is estimated. In 
fact, the  -th element of codeword  , denoted by   , is 
estimated as  ̂         ̂  |   |   and hence the estimated 
codeword  ̂    ̂     ̂ ) can be obtained [7]. Then, the 
estimation of the vector    is obtained as   ̂   ̂  
⌈ ̂   ⌋  ⌈ ̂ ⌋ . Finally, the message is estimated as  ̂  
  ̂   . Fig. 1 illustrates the block diagram of the proposed 
public key scheme based on LDLCs. As can be viewed from 
this figure, at the first step, Alice fetches    from the public 
directory. Then, she constructs the codeword (lattice point) as 
      and adds the Gaussian perturbation vector with zero-
mean and variance          ⁄  to it. Also, the ciphertext 
      is transmitted over the insecure noiseless channel. On 
the other hand, Bob, by the help of LDLC decoding algorithm, 
can estimate the closest lattice point to the ciphertext, i.e., 
 ̂    ̂ , and recover   ̂  ⌈ ̂ ⌋ . Finally, the message is 
estimated as ̂    ̂   . It is clear that the encryptor and the 
LDLC encoder are combined together at the transmitter. Also, 
the decryptor and the LDLC decoder are joined together at the 
receiver. 
Note that for the power constrained AWGN channel, the 
LDLC encoding/decoding operations must be performed with 
shaping region to prevent the codeword’s power from being 
too large [7]. As aforementioned in Sec. III-C, since the 
variance of perturbation vector   is bounded by Poltyrev limit, 
i.e.,          ⁄ , the shaping region boundaries is ignored in 
the encoding/decoding algorithms of the used LDLC. This 
operation has the following advantages for our scheme: (1) 
Since the number of points of the used LDLC, without 
considering the shaping region, is usually huge for the active 
attacker (Oscar), he cannot use an exhaustive method to 
implement the LDLC decoding operation. In fact, recovering 
the generator matrix   from the public key           is 
equivalent to solve SBP for Oscar. Also, finding the closest 
lattice vector, i.e.,        , to the ciphertext   is equivalent 
to solve LDP for him. (2) Ignoring the shaping region 
boundaries in the LDLC encoding /decoding can decrease the 
encryption/decryption complexity of the proposed scheme. 
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Fig. 1. The block diagram of the proposed public key cryptosystem based on LDLCs. 
IV. EFFICIENCY 
 In this section, the efficiency of the proposed cryptosystem 
is evaluated in terms of its key length and computational 
complexity.  
A. Key Length 
It is shown that for large dimension        and degree 
    , a set of generating sequence           ,     , 
  ∑   
  
     
 ⁄   , can result the parity check matrix   which 
satisfies all required properties to have efficient iterative LDLC 
decoding [7]. Moreover, the experiments on the security of the 
GGH-like cryptosystems based on HNF basis are shown that 
one necessary condition to achieve high security level is to 
apply the lattices with dimension       [16]. Hence, we use 
the LDLC with        and degree      to improve the 
security and efficiency of the proposed scheme. We employ the 
Micciancio’s idea [8] by which the public key of the proposed 
scheme is obtained as the HNF of the generator matrix of used 
LDLC. In this case, the public key size requires           
bits compared to GGH cryptosystem, whose public key size 
requires           bits. Table I denotes the comparison 
between the public key lengths of the GGH and the proposed 
schemes. It is clear that applying the large dimensions, i.e., 
               , for the original GGH scheme is 
impractical. However, the key length of the proposed scheme, 
by using the Micciancio’s method is decreased significantly 
compared to the key lengths of GGH public key scheme. For 
example, for the dimension equal to      , the key length of 
the proposed scheme decreases up to 97 percent. 
                                                 TABLE I 
COMPARING THE KEY LENGTHS OF THE GGH AND PROPOSED SCHEMES. 
         Scheme 
 
Dimension 
GGH 
Scheme 
Proposed 
Scheme 
                    
                  
                
                   
                   
B. Computational Complexity 
As illustrated in Fig. 1, encryption procedure is performed 
by calculating the codeword       and then adding the 
Gaussian perturbation vector   to  . Therefore, the encryption 
complexity can be expressed as                        , 
where,               
   is the encoding complexity of the 
used LDLC and                 is the number of required 
binary operations for addition of  -symbol Gaussian 
perturnbation vector   to the codeword   (by asuming that the 
entries of   are bounded by  ). However, in the case of 
implementing a CCA2-secure variant (see Sec. V-D), the 
complexity of performing some suitable scrambling operation 
on the message   before multiplication by    should be 
considered. The decryption complexity of this scheme is 
expressed as                     (  ̂ 
  ) , where 
                is the decoding complexity of the used 
LDLC and     (  ̂ 
  )           is the number of 
required binary operations to perform the product of the 
estimated vector   ̂  ⌈ ̂ ⌋  by the inverse of unimodular 
matrix   (by asuming that the entries of   are bounded by  ). 
V.  SECURITY 
In this section, the cryptanalytic strength of the proposed 
scheme against some well-known attacks is being examined. 
A. The Embedding Attack 
The embedding attack [6] is an efficient method to directly 
solve  -CVP and seems to be practically the best way to break 
a CVP-based public key cryptosystem. This attack has been 
successfully used by Nguyen [6] to break the GGH 
cryptosystem. To perform this attack against GGH scheme, 
first the integer vector   { }  is added to the ciphertext 
      ,   {  }  of the GGH scheme and then the 
modular equation                 
  is obtained, 
where              . By subtracting the vector     
  
from the ciphertext  , the vector  −     
  ( −    ) 
  
  is obtained. Now, this equation is divided by   , the 
equation   −     
    ⁄          ⁄  is obtained, where 
     −       ⁄ . In this case, since the rational point 
  −     
    ⁄  is known, the simplified CVP-instance with a 
much smaller perturbation vector    ⁄  { 
 
 
}
 
 is obtained. 
The error vector length is now √  ⁄ , compared to  √ , 
previously. By this way, the problem of decrypting ciphertexts 
(CVP-instances for which the error vector has entries   ) is 
reduced to a simpler CVP-instance for which the error vector 
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has entries  
 
 
. As it is mentioned, the embedding attack is 
applicable if the employed perturbation vector   has the 
particular form, e.g.,   {  } . In the proposed public key 
scheme, since the perturbation vector   is Gaussian vector 
with mean   and variance          ⁄ , the entries of   are 
not known exactly for attacker and therefore the modular 
equation         
  cannot be accessed. Hence, the 
simplified CVP-instance with a much smaller perturbation 
vector cannot be attained to break the proposed scheme.  
B. The Round-Off Attack 
In the round-off attack [2], first it is tried to multiply the 
inverse of public key           by the ciphertext   as 
                 . Then, the attacker does an exhaustive 
search to find the vector          . If the vector   is found 
by an exhaustive search, the message   will be recovered 
successfully. Therefore, the size of the search space needed for 
finding the correct vector   should be large enough to prevent 
the Round-off attack. Below, we evaluate an approximate size 
of the search space in the proposed public key scheme. Let    
and    denote the  -th entry in the vectors     
      and the 
perturbation vector  , respectively. Let   
   be the  -th row of 
       and    
   be the      -th element in the matrix       . 
Using these notations, we have      
     ∑    
  
   ,         
and         ∑    
   
  [  
 ]    ‖  
  ‖  , where ‖  
  ‖  is the 
Euclidean norm of the  -th row in       . To calculate the size 
of search space for the vector  , it is assumed that each entry 
   in   is Gaussian and all the entries are independent. In this 
case, the size of search space is exponential in the differential 
entropy of the Gaussian random vector  . The differential 
entropy of   with variance    is obtained as      
 
 
          . Since it is assumed that   ’s are independent, the 
differential entropy of the vector   equals the sum of the 
differential entropies of the entries, i.e.,       
 
 
          
∑    ‖  
  ‖ . Hence, the size of search space is obtained as 
    
           ⁄     ∏ ‖  
  ‖ . In the proposed scheme, 
since          ⁄ , we have       ⁄  
  ⁄  ∏ ‖  
  ‖ . It is 
shown that the Round-off attack is capable to recognize the 
vector   up to dimension 100. In the proposed scheme, since 
the used dimension is more than 1000, this attack is also 
doomed to fail. 
C. The Nearest Plane Attack 
In the nearest plane attack [2], a better approximation 
technique is used to improve the round-off attack. In this 
attack, by the knowledge of public key   , it is tried to apply 
the LLL lattice reduction algorithm [17] to obtain a reduced 
basis   {        } . Now, for a given ciphertext   and a 
reduced basis  , all the affine spaces are considered as 
   {     ∑     
   
         }  for all      Then, the 
hyperplane    is found which is the closest point, denoted by 
 , to the ciphertext  . Also, the point  −     is projected onto 
the   −   -dimensional space which is spanned by    
{         }. By this way, a new point  
   −     and a new 
basis    are obtained. Such algorithm is proceeded recursively 
to find the closest point to   , denoted by   , in this   −   -
dimensional lattice   . Finally, by finding the point   , the 
point          can be computed. In summary, the nearest-
plane attack is partitioned into two parts: (1) the offline 
process in which the public key           is transformed to 
the reduced basis   by using the lattice reduction algorithms; 
(2) the online process in which the inverse of reduced basis   
is multiplied by the ciphertext   as in the similar way used in 
the Round-off attack. The work factor of this attack can be 
computed from the Euclidean norm of the rows in the 
generator matrix  . It is shown that the Nearest plane attack 
has a lower work factor than the Round-off attack. But its 
work factor grows exponentially with the dimension of the 
lattice. Experiments show that this attack is infeasible for the 
dimensions 140-150 [2]. For the proposed scheme, since the 
used dimension is more than 1000, this attack is also failed. 
D. The Adaptive Chosen Ciphertext Attack  
It is shown that both McEliece and GGH cryptosystems are 
insecure against adaptive chosen ciphertext attacks (CCA2) 
[18, 21]. Therefore, generic [10, 18] and specific [19] CCA2-
secure conversions can be used to make these schemes secure 
against CCA2. All applied methods in these conversions are 
based on scrambling the message inputs. In the proposed 
public key scheme, the ciphertext is        , where  is a 
message and   is a Gaussian perturbation vector. In this case, 
if an adversary encrypts one of two messages   and   and 
obtains a ciphertext  , then the attacker can distinguish a 
plaintext   if ‖   
 −  ‖  ‖   
 −  ‖. In such attack, given 
a ciphertext        , an adversary inputs the        to 
the decryption oracle for some    and obtains the output of  
the decryption oracle, i.e.,  ̂ . Then, the adversary can find out 
the original message  by calculating   ̂ −   . It means 
that the proposed scheme is insecure against CCA2. To obtain 
the security against CCA2, we can apply the Fujisaki-
Okamoto generic conversion [10] in the proposed scheme as 
follows. Let   ,    be a symmetric encryption and a 
decryption form with a key  , respectively. Let   and   be 
random oracles. Then,           and the ciphertext is 
obtained as           
               . For the 
decryption, using the LDLC decoding, first    ̂    ̂   is 
estimated and  ̂     ̂        is obtained. Then, the estimate 
of perturbation vector  ̂    −   ̂ 
  is computed. Now, a 
plaintext ̂            with the secret key      is recovered. 
If (   ̂  ̂ )    ̂    , then the output of decryption oracle is 
 ̂. Otherwise, the decryption fails. By this way, an adaptive 
chosen ciphertext attack can be prevented for the proposed 
scheme.  
E. The Broadcast Attack 
In [20], Hastad presented an efficient attack, called as 
broadcast attack, in which the message is recovered in the 
broadcast scenario (i.e., sending a single message to different 
recipients using their respective public keys). Inspired by 
Hastad’s method, two types of the broadcast attack are 
presented in [21] against the GGH cryptosystem. In these 
attacks, it is assumed that the sender encrypts the single 
message for different receivers. In this way, a random message 
  is encrypted with different random public keys   
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     , is encrypted for different receivers and various 
ciphertexts       
            are obtained. The goal is 
to recover the message      without any knowledge of 
receiver’s secret key. It is shown that the intersecting lattice 
has interesting properties in the broadcast attack againt GGH 
scheme. Let    and    be two lattices, then the intersecting 
lattice of them is obtained as          
    
   . In the first 
type of broadcast attack, it is demonstrated that solving the 
shortest vector problem on the intersection lattice       will 
be easier than each of    or   . In such attack, given the public 
keys   
         , and the ciphertexts           , the 
embedding basis   
    [
  
  
   
]  is computed. Then, the 
intersection lattice        ⋂     
        is obtained. Finally, 
the vector       is found as the shortest vector of lattice 
      . By this way, the message  can be recovered. In the 
second type of broadcast attack, first, the basis     ∑   
  
    is 
obtained. Then, the vector     ∑   
 
    is computed and the 
closest vector   of     is found in the lattice       . Finally, the 
message           is recovered.  
To resist the proposed public key cryptosystem against 
broadcast attack, similar to CCA2-secure scheme, a random 
part (that is sufficiently big) should be added to the messages 
to prevent two messages to be equal under a reasonable 
probability. In fact, if the half of the message   is random, the 
proposed scheme is secure against the broadcast attack. The 
scrambling method of message using the Fujisaki-Okamoto 
generic conversion for this scheme is suggested in Sec. V-D 
by which can be secure against this attack. However, using 
such conversion has repercussion in the computational 
complexity of this scheme. 
VI. CONCLUSION  
The current paper was an attempt to address the issue of 
applying low density lattice codes in the structure of a public 
key cryptosystem. Compared to GGH cryptosystem, the 
efficiency of new scheme is improved from two following 
aspects: (1) due to the use of low complexity LDLC decoding, 
the decryption complexity is decreased; (2) because of 
considering the HNF of generator matrix as the public key, the 
key length is reduced up to 97 percent in the dimension 
      . Moreover, by exploiting the following strategies, 
the new scheme is better than the original GGH scheme from 
the security point of view: (1) using the Gaussian vector 
whose variance is upper bounded by Poltyrev limit, i.e., 
         ⁄ , as the perturbation vector to resist against the 
embedding attack; (2) increasing the dimension of used LDLC 
(due to the increased efficiency of the proposed scheme) to 
resist the round-off and the nearest plane attacks; (3) 
employing the generic Fujisaki-Okamoto conversion to resist 
against CCA2 and broadcast attacks. 
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